Can someone explain in regards to Germany and WW II . . . .

carguychris

New member
pathdoc said:
It has, true - but some of the stuff along the way has been fascinating.
Agreed. Speaking of which... :)
ChrisTx said:
Two reasons...daytime American bombing, and nighttime British bombing.
FWIW many military analysts and historians have argued that the joint US/UK heavy bombing campaign was largely ineffective at crippling German industrial production, or at the very least, was very inefficient in terms of Allied lives lost and resources expended.

The basic problems were that precision targeting was unfeasible using the technology available at the time, forcing the Allies to rely on volume instead, but this didn't work well either because of the technical limits of the aircraft being used. The amount of fuel required to reach the targets limited the bomb load, and the Americans made things worse by weighing down their bombers with lots of gun-wielding crewmen (who would prove to be very ineffective at warding off attacking fighters). Although the number of Allied heavy bombers built during WWII seems staggering in hindsight, it was never enough to put more than a few bombers over a few targets at any given time.

The bombing campaign didn't become effective until relatively late in the war when the Allies finally began fielding effective fighter escorts at around the same time that the Luftwaffe had to start fighting off the American and Commonwealth land invasion. Another reason for the increase in effectiveness was that the Luftwaffe (and the Japanese) never effectively dealt with the fact that it's easier to replace airplanes than to replace pilots; by this time, their aircrew training resources had been stretched past the breaking point, and they were sending increasingly younger and less experienced pilots against seasoned Allied aircrew.* IOW the bombing campaign didn't begin working until German defeat was becoming inevitable regardless of the bombing. :rolleyes:

Ironically, many analysts have concluded that the bombing campaign probably hastened the German defeat for a major but unplanned reason: the Germans attempted to defend their cities with thousands of AA batteries, but the Allies could only bomb a few cities at a time, so tens of thousands of men and light artillery pieces spent most of their time silently guarding an empty sky rather than shooting at Soviet tanks on the Eastern Front. :)

*On a related note, in terms of lives lost and resources expended versus damage inflicted, the oft-maligned Japanese "kamikaze" anti-ship suicide attacks were actually MUCH MORE effective against the US Navy than conventional air attacks. Besides requiring less pilot training, an airplane can carry more bombs vs. fuel when it doesn't have to come back, and an attacking airplane presents less of a target when it approaches a ship head-on and doesn't leave, rather than flying over and away, thereby giving the gunners more chances to shoot at it!
 

Rainbow Demon

New member
EDIT: also wikipedia is not the best place to quote information from, anyone can edit the information therein so if I really wanted to I could say that the K98K was developed in Narnia and fired rainbows... the information was written by guys just like you and me and unless they were actually part of those councils that decided to convert to a different caliber then they have no idea what the true motivations were.
While Wiki has its limitations, those entries that quote sources and provide links are still useful, so long as you already know what you are looking for.

I've spent much of my online time for the last ten years or so finding and studying authoritative sources on the effectiveness of rifle cartridges, written by British and American military surgeons and eye witnesses in war zones, as well as major figures in designing military rifle bullets and civilian authorities on sporting rifle and military cartridge development and testing.
Most of these sources are in public domain and can be downloaded in PDF form for close study.

As for the Swedes deciding that the 6.5 was too light for long range machinegun use, that should be obvious.
The 6.5X55 is the best of the 6.5 military cartridges, yet it had its limitations, and WW1 made this clear enough even to non combatant countries on the sidelines.
When you go from round nose bullets to spire point you either drop some weight or you increase the length of the bullet. When bullet length increases you either find a better propelent or reduce powder charge to avoid excessive pressures.
A .30 cartridge can handle a 175 grain spire point just fine without excessive pressures, same for the .303, because both were originally developed to use 220-225 gr bullets. Reducing weight allowed full powder capacity.
Going from a 156 gr round nose in 6.5 to a spire point meant 140 gr was the heaviest you could use without reducing powder capacity.
Much the same applied to the 7X57, which started out with a 175 gr round nose.

The 175 gr .30/7.62 is the best compromise if you want true long range performance. A lighter bullet may reach that far, but not retain enough energy to produce a deadly wound, especially if the enemy has any respectable body armor, which is available to all but the poorest third world armies, or even light cover.

If the military insists on close quarter full auto capability for an infantry rifle, then its time for some serious R&D on weapons designs.
The Russians developed an odd looking but effective full auto rifle some years back. I personally don't like the look of those, over engineered and gawky, but highly controllable in burst fire.

The 5.56 will be around for many decades to come, but is likely to be relegated to PDW status as better weapons and cartridges are developed.
 

Bob Wright

New member
Mike Irwin said:
As for the M1 carbine, it was NEVER intended to be a front line combat weapon.

I understand that, and am well aware of the fact. My response was in rebuttal to those who thought it a better weapon in close-in or jungle fighting.

However, while I was in Korea I did pick an M2 carbine for patrols along the DMZ. Often fitted with the grenade launcher for flares or smoke grenades.

Bob Wright
 

Pilot

New member
What about the STG 44? Did this represent a change on philosophy, and tactics for German infantry? Yes, it came late in the war, and not in as great numbers, but it was a revolutionary firearm.
 
No one is saying that the German army didn't have the ability to develop/field new weapons.

It would have been, however, very difficult for the Germans to totally re-equip their military with the STG-44 at any point in its development, although it would have been somewhat easier to do given its greatly simplified manufacturing requirements -- very little precise forging or stamping, mostly stamping and welding...

An entire Wermacht armed with STG-44-type firearms would have been a very frightening thing indeed.
 

RJay

New member
Carguychris, thanks for the post, WWII proved one military fact, all the bombers in the world can not occupy not hold territory. Until the very last Germany was turning out vast amounts of war materials, last year of the war I believe they turned out 10,000 fighters, yet there were a number of Senior British ( and a few Americans ) who believed that conventional bombing would force the Germans to the table.
The STG, like the M1 Garand needed a couple more years of shakedown. before it was a perfected weapon . Reports from the users in field were not very complimentary, like all new weapon systems, it had a lot of teething problems. One after action report from a German paratrooper condemned it and it's designer to purgatory.:)
 

44 AMP

Staff
The explanation is actually simple...

The reason the Germans did not develope and field a semi auto rifle as their main service rifle is economics. They had the 98 Mauser, and more importantly, they had the means to make 98 Mausers.

Yes, Hitler (and some others) felt the 98K was perfectly adequate and discouraged further rifle developement as a waste of resources.

The time, effort and money needed for a semi auto rifle was better spent designing and making tanks, aircraft, machine guns, and even U-boats.

Also don't forget that up until the end of 41 the Germans had been winning everywhere, and it wasn't until 43 that it was clear to some Germans that they would not win the war. Some Germans, especially the leadership never did believe Germany would not win, until the last few months of the war...

When you are winning, there is no pressing need to develope the next generation of weapons. When you are losing, its generally too late. THis is Victory Disease.

Germany, despite the fame of its Panzer units never was able to convert their armies fully to motorized transport, either. Horse drawn transport and artillery was the majority throughout the entire war. The success of the fully motorized units fully overshadowed the fact that the bulk of German land forces were not much ahead of WW I units in anything other than radios and machineguns.
 

tahunua001

New member
since we keep circling around and around to what Hitler felt was necessary, has anyone ever picked up a book entitled 'my tank is fight'?
mostly it's very implausable prototype weapons of WWII and well over half the book details weapons of Nazi Germany alone.
Tanks the size of battle ships
submersible cruisers
infrared targeting systems

this is where Hitler thought Germany was going technologically but there was no room for a semi auto?
 

44 AMP

Staff
Some of my other hobbies...

Are model building and the study of WWII, particularly the arms, armor, aircraft, and other equipment used, by all sides. I have an extensive reference library, specializing in armor & small arms, and have a good friend who's library dwarfs mine, his specialty being aircraft, mostly.

Have never heard of that book you mention, but I do have lots of others, including ones written by the actual people involved, so I'm fairly confident of the accuracy of the information, cross checked with many other sources.

The history of the German war machine in WWII is a fascinating, complex and often bewildering story. Sometimes, it boggles the mind the obvious things they overlooked, or even forbid, balanced against some of the clear genius and innovation of some of their designs.

A great deal of effort was wasted in design and production of a bewildering array of vehicles, for example. And on top of the Nazi bureauacracy is Hitler himself, who made decisions on all kinds of things from overall campaign strategy to literally miniscule equipment designs.

When the rearming of the Wehrmacht began in earnest (1935), Hitler's plans were not to go to way before 1945. The navy would have been built up to where they actually could have cut off the convoy lifeline to England, instead of nearly being able to do so. The rest of the military would have been similarly powerful.

But that's not what happened. Hitler saw an opportunity, gambled, and went to war much earlier than planned for. And the Germans themselves were surprised at how successful they were, in the beginning. They had the resources and organization to conduct a "short, victorious war". SO did the Japanese. They didn't get it. What they got was a protracted fight against an enemy who would not surrender or condone an armistice. And so, after initial successes, things turned the other way for them, and lead to their ultimate defeat.

US manufacturing capacity, and our unique geographical position meant that our access to resources and industrial base was largely un-interruptable. That alone would have given the Allies the ultimate victory, but it was aided by numerous blunders wasting what resources the Axis had.

Also note that it took us almost two years from the actual start of our direct involvement in the war (free from interference with our industry and resources) to fully convert America to the "Arsenal of Democracy". And that our entire nation was actively involved, with rationing and resource collection drives (metal, rubber, etc.)

Example: in Germany, tanks were built by the makers of heavy equipment and locomotives. Firms with long experience building things slowly and "properly". In the US, while pre-war tanks were often built by these kinds of industry, we switched production over to the automotive industry, who had experience with building lots of units quickly. And we made a serious effort to maximize the ease of mass production.

On the other hand, some of the things the Germans learned from "modern" war they took advantage of more than we did. Small arms, being one example.

Prior to WWII, all nations built their arms the "old fashioned way". They built them like civilian guns. Wood & steel, fine machineing, capable of giving decades or longer of good service. Doing it this way takes time, money, and skilled craftsmen (another scarce resource). Modern mobile warfare eats things at unbelievable rates. Not just men, but their machines as well. The lesson it taught was that lots of "good enough" was better than fewer of "the best". And sometimes the "best" wasn't really the best, either.

Germany found out in WW I that the P.08 Luger wasn't all that good a combat pistol. But Germany armed their troops with them in WWII, not dropping production until 1942. Why? Because they had the machinery and skill to make them, and it wasn't until halfway through the war the cost/benefit shifted enough to make them abandon production in favor of other things. The MG 34 is a fine design, but the MG 42, with its stampings is cheaper faster,and easier to make, and works as well, if not better in combat.

The Mauser bolt action was "in the bank" so to speak, and all Germany needed to do was ramp up the production lines to have good, servicable bolt actions, in quantity. Much better for a dictator wanting an "instant" army than taking the time, and cost to develope a better (semiauto) rifle, and get the bugs worked out,and then get it in mass production.

When it comes down to it, the Germans were perhaps the greatest toymakers of WWII. But they wasted so much on making toys that either didn't work well, weren't used right, or didn't work any better than what was already in production that they never had as much of what was needed as they wanted, overall.

We made our share of boneheaded choices as well, but in the end, our's didn't hurt us as much as theirs did them.
 
"this is where Hitler thought Germany was going technologically but there was no room for a semi auto?"

Pie in the sky plans on paper are one thing, and they often have little to do with economic and manufacturing reality.

Just because the Germans laid out plans for 90,000 ton battleships with 20 inch main guns doesn't mean that they had the economic or industrial capacity to build it OR rearm their military with semi-automatic/selective fire battle rifles.
 

tahunua001

New member
"this is where Hitler thought Germany was going technologically but there was no room for a semi auto?"

Pie in the sky plans on paper are one thing, and they often have little to do with economic and manufacturing reality.

it's been a little while since I read the book and it was more of a boredom halfway through a 7 month deployment type read so I'm fuzzy on details but it seems that many of these pipedreams at least made it to the prototype stage, tanks like the P1000 Ratte, with crews of over 40 which never had a chance to be field tested and the panzer 7 maus that had enough prototypes in enough factories to be captured by both soviet and british forces.

again... not sure as to the validity of the claims but seems that there are a few different sources online that seem to corroberate... at least on the tanks...



Just because the Germans laid out plans for 90,000 ton battleships with 20 inch main guns doesn't mean that they had the economic or industrial capacity to build it OR rearm their military with semi-automatic/selective fire battle rifles.
they didn't get all the way there but the bismarck class battle ships came pretty close... sortof...
 

bumnote

New member
It's also worth noting that the Nazi Germany didn't enact a total war economy until 1943. While the US, USSR, UK all went to a total war economy from the moment hostilities started for each of them, the Nazi's delayed it until the war was just short of 4 years old for them. Any new weapons systems is going to be slowed as a result. Semi-auto rifles, aircraft carriers, wonder weapons...all of that would be slower to put into service as a result.
Even if they had developed an atomic bomb...nothing that would even approach being an effective delivery system.
 

SIGSHR

New member
Conversely we can wonder why the US didn't develop a light easily manufactured machine gun with quick change barrels ala the MG34 and MG42?
And did the M-1 Garand really make that much of a difference, Patton's comments not withstanding?
 

kilimanjaro

New member
We tried to clone the MG42 early in the war, just couldn't work it right with the 30/06 round. The option was offered to copy it in 7.92mm but we did not want to produce two different battle cartridges, so we stayed with the 30/06 weapons. We finally produced a decent copy in the Vietnam era, the
M60, but still wouldn't accept the rate of fire that made the MG42 so formidable.
 
"they didn't get all the way there but the bismarck class battle ships came pretty close... sortof..."

Bismarck and Tirpitz had 15" main guns, well within what other navies were building at the time. Bismark was also based on rather tried and true naval design concepts carried over from First World War ships.

The monsters that Germany planned on paper would have taken them far beyond that, or what most other nations were even capable of at the time.

For every inch increase in the shell diameter the shell adds disproportionately more weight, and becomes increasingly difficult to handle. The Japanese found that out with their two super battleships with 18.1" guns. Ironing out the shell handling problems was a very involved process that apparently was never 100% satisfactory.

Oh, and I was wrong... the H-44 class, which would have carried the 20" guns, had a design weight of 130,000 tons and a length of over 1,100 feet.

In order to produce a ship like that, German would have had to have virtually stopped production of tanks and many other armaments just to supply the armor plating in a reasonable amount of time.

And, even if they did, there was nowhere in Germany to build a ship that big.

As I said, pie in the sky planning (or even building prototype tanks of unusual proportions) doesn't mean you have the ability to actually produce that stuff in numbers substantial enough to make a difference.
 
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tahunua001

New member
agreed... I was actually trying to be slightly facetious with my remarks about the bismarck. a battle ship of the proportions you are listing would be roughly the same dimensions as a Nimitz class aircraft carrier...
not something I think even engineers of today could tackle very easily.
 
Air superiority, then air supremacy supporting ground forces can be so overwhelming, especially (as some people reminded us) when large industrialized nations are the enemy.

If the Luftwaffe had continued to launch sorties against both the English coastal radar -helped by spotters etc- and the very critical RAF airfields, instead of switching primary tactical bombing to English cities as Vergeltung/vengeance for the RAF's first revenge attack on Berlin, the Germans might have kept US forces from later using England as a strategic "aircraft carrier" and vast, handy troop base.

It's doubtful, at least to me, that German divisions with Garands would have made much of a difference.

And the P-47's extremely tough, air-cooled radial engines (as with the airframe) were not nearly as vulnerable to overheating during strafing sorties as the 'water'-cooled P-51's engines when coolant was lost.
 
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Has there ever been a war where small arms turned the tide?
Disease and weather killed more than battle through the civil war period.
By WWI heavy machine guns and artillery were causing battlefield casualties. I am not sure if the disease still killed more in WWI or not, but it was at least close.

Russian tanks and US & British firebombing destroyed germany in WWII. The number of tanks on the Eastern front was incredible. Glantz and Frieser say more tanks lost at Kursk than ever present on the western front.

Now even infantry tactics often rely on calling in firepower rather than winning with rifles. There are obviously exceptions in circumstances where support is not available or viable.
 
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