Read down to see the highlighted portions indicating how Hussein plans to defeat the U.S. The sad thing is that it will almost certainly be effective...
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (condensed)
November 4, 2002
Preparations Indicate US Readiness For Conflict With Iraq, Initiated By Air War, Starting Late November 2002
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS (Global Information System), with field report inputs. The framework, timing, political and military doctrine for the US-led attack on Iraq is taking shape, with the prospect of Coalition air assaults ready to begin against Iraqi targets around the third week of November 2002 - before the end of the month of Ramadan- with formal Coalition ground force insertion possible around New Year 2003.
Coalition special forces - US, British, Australian and possibly French and New Zealand - would engage inside Iraq well before the formal ground force entry, not just as target designators for air attacks, but to engage in intelligence and sabotage ops. The emerging timeframe is highlighted by growing US pressure on the United Nations to develop a suitable resolution to set the stage for military action. The US mid-term elections and the Turkish general elections would have been disposed-of on November 5 and 3, 2002, respectively.
This GIS timing assessment appears to agree with reports on Iraqi expectations of US intentions.
Iraqi Disposition: It seems likely that Iraqi Army regular forces - the least capable and least trusted of the ground forces - would be deployed around Mosul to the north and Basra to the south, apart from the continued deployment of a substantial force of Army, Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard with the al-Quds forces in the far West, poised for ops against Israel. Substantial Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces, along with air defense forces, would center around Baghdad and the national command authority.
Given the different geopolitical scenario compared with 1990-91, Coalition forces must be expected to channel up the highways from the Persian Gulf and down the main highway from the north. Just as this made Iraqi forces vulnerable in 1991, it now makes invading forces vulnerable to pre-positioned massive explosives. Some Western analysts believe that if Hussein has even one nuclear weapon - or nuclear device - it would be positioned to destroy US forces, perhpas including a substantial number of Iraqis, along such a choke-point.
GIS sources indicate that most regional and Iraqi military leaders feel that Iraq cannot resist a US assault, but could only hope to make the US entry as costly as possible as soon in the war as possible, and then to draw out the fighting into Baghdad to the point where the US Media would make continued US engagement untenable.
This is a high-risk strategy for Hussein, but possibly the only one open to him, apart from attempts to widen the war by attacking Israel or to create a broadly-based new Arab-Israeli War, which would deny regional basing to the US and which would in many ways vitiate Coalition freedom of action in air, ground and sea-space adjacent to Iraq or essential to the war against it. It is assumed that Pres. Saddam has a personal exit strategy, to sustain the myth that he could not personally be defeated by the US. Significantly, although there are many Iraqi military personnel who would be prepared to abandon Pres. Saddam at the earliest opportunity, many Iraqis extrapolate in that case national unity would be lost and, like Afghanistan, a weak central government could see the rise of separatist, regionalist forces.
Significantly, the principal anticipated US allies in the war against Saddam are the Kurdish groupings in the Iraqi north. However, an end to the Saddam Administration would end Kurdish control of illegally smuggled oil through Kurdish territory to Turkey--a significant source of income. Also the Kurdish rôle in smuggling oil into Turkey has to a large extent kept Turkey from attacking the Kurds inside Iraq. For the Kurds, then, the overthrow of Saddam - despite his past atrocities against the Kurds - would presage a worsened security and economic situation.
Iraqi Doctrine: The main forces of the Iraqi Army would probably be used merely to slow Coalition ground force penetration toward Baghdad. Principal fighting would be conducted in Baghdad, and possibly some of the corridor urban areas leading to it. Although US analysts, for the most part, anticipate that Saddam would use chemical weapons, it is most likely that the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units would use mostly mustard gas weapons. It is easily made, stores well, and the Iraqis have considerable experience with it.
Iraqi personnel witnessed and learned from the Israeli ops in Jenin, earlier in 2002, just as US special forces personnel also witnessed the operations while accompanying Israel Defense Force (IDF) units in the IDF attacks. The booby-trapping of Jenin by Palestinian forces - many supported by, or trained by Iraqi special forces - will probably be emulated inside Iraqi urban areas, but on a more devastating scale, since Saddam is clearly willing to sacrifice large numbers of Iraqis to defend his position. Principal urban weapons will be RPG (rocket-propelled grenades) and sniper fire, as well as mortar-delivered and booby-trap mustard-gas weapons. This will substantially slow Coalition progress urban areas, and coalition forces will need to "suit up" in chemical protection attire, and operate under closed-down conditions in armored vehicles for much of the fighting. This will make the conflict far more costly, slow and messy than the 1991 Gulf War.
Although there has been concern over possible Iraqi Army acquisition of as many as 2,800 Renault tanker trucks, GIS analysts were more concerned with finding evidence of Iraqi acquisition of field kitchen units, which would be key to preparation of mustard and other agents for booby traps and mortar payloads. Also, the tanker trucks could form the basis of mobile booby traps.
External preparation: There is ongoing concern within key US and allied military circles as to whether all factors have been considered carefully enough by the US leadership, before embarking on the war against Saddam. Significantly, none of the military sources contacted by GIS doubted the US-led Coalition's ability to succeed in overthrowing the Saddam Government and subduing Iraq, provided the White House could sustain its will.
There was some doubt expressed by even US sources that the Bush Administration could sustain the will to total victory if the fighting became protracted and the casualties became serious, while at the same time media criticism became pronounced.
However, White House sources indicate that the Bush administration felt it had no option other than to push ahead, despite difficulties--any withdrawal partway through the operation would lead to a decisive and protracted escalation from Islamist groups as well as from Muslim states alienated by the war. Israeli forces were themselves preparing for an escalation in regional conflict, and were clearly not depending on US protection in a possible wider war. The Israel Air Force (IAF) was scheduled to begin exercises on a full war footing during the week of November 3, 2002, with all facets of the IAF involved.
Meanwhile, the aircraft carrier USS Constellation departed its home base of San Diego, California, on November 2, 2002, heading a six-ship carrier battle group on a six-month mission. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group is already deployed--there would be a period where both of them were deployed simultaneously in the Gulf. Another US carrier group is in the Mediterranean, giving some 225 combat aircraft available for action against Iraq, apart from US Air Force aircraft in the region, and from US and European bases.
The US Defense Department said during the last week of October 2002 that B-2 strategic bombers would be sent to bases in Britain and to Diego Garcia, putting them closer to Iraq. The US Navy also said on November 1, 2002, that it was looking for commercial shipping to take ammunition and vehicles to the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea amid a repositioning of US forces. The USN has already awarded a stream of contracts to take armor, ammunition and other military equipment to the region ahead of any military intervention in Iraq. US Defense Department officials said that they expected the contracts to be completed in time for delivery of the equipment in late November or early December 2002.
Russia said that the UN Security Council was nearing agreement on the terms for resuming weapons inspections in Iraq, but that "serious" disagreement remained over the US threat of force. Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, met Security Council members on November 1, 2002, and UN inspectors were due to go to Larnaca, Cyprus, on November 2-3, 2002, to start setting up a staging post for their operations in Iraq. Blix had said that an advance party could arrive in Baghdad between seven and 10 days after a resolution was adopted. GIS sources, however, have noted the difficulty inspectors would face in finding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction assets, because of the extensive programs of placing assets on mobile platforms including trucks and barges.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (condensed)
November 4, 2002
Preparations Indicate US Readiness For Conflict With Iraq, Initiated By Air War, Starting Late November 2002
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS (Global Information System), with field report inputs. The framework, timing, political and military doctrine for the US-led attack on Iraq is taking shape, with the prospect of Coalition air assaults ready to begin against Iraqi targets around the third week of November 2002 - before the end of the month of Ramadan- with formal Coalition ground force insertion possible around New Year 2003.
Coalition special forces - US, British, Australian and possibly French and New Zealand - would engage inside Iraq well before the formal ground force entry, not just as target designators for air attacks, but to engage in intelligence and sabotage ops. The emerging timeframe is highlighted by growing US pressure on the United Nations to develop a suitable resolution to set the stage for military action. The US mid-term elections and the Turkish general elections would have been disposed-of on November 5 and 3, 2002, respectively.
This GIS timing assessment appears to agree with reports on Iraqi expectations of US intentions.
Iraqi Disposition: It seems likely that Iraqi Army regular forces - the least capable and least trusted of the ground forces - would be deployed around Mosul to the north and Basra to the south, apart from the continued deployment of a substantial force of Army, Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard with the al-Quds forces in the far West, poised for ops against Israel. Substantial Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces, along with air defense forces, would center around Baghdad and the national command authority.
Given the different geopolitical scenario compared with 1990-91, Coalition forces must be expected to channel up the highways from the Persian Gulf and down the main highway from the north. Just as this made Iraqi forces vulnerable in 1991, it now makes invading forces vulnerable to pre-positioned massive explosives. Some Western analysts believe that if Hussein has even one nuclear weapon - or nuclear device - it would be positioned to destroy US forces, perhpas including a substantial number of Iraqis, along such a choke-point.
GIS sources indicate that most regional and Iraqi military leaders feel that Iraq cannot resist a US assault, but could only hope to make the US entry as costly as possible as soon in the war as possible, and then to draw out the fighting into Baghdad to the point where the US Media would make continued US engagement untenable.
This is a high-risk strategy for Hussein, but possibly the only one open to him, apart from attempts to widen the war by attacking Israel or to create a broadly-based new Arab-Israeli War, which would deny regional basing to the US and which would in many ways vitiate Coalition freedom of action in air, ground and sea-space adjacent to Iraq or essential to the war against it. It is assumed that Pres. Saddam has a personal exit strategy, to sustain the myth that he could not personally be defeated by the US. Significantly, although there are many Iraqi military personnel who would be prepared to abandon Pres. Saddam at the earliest opportunity, many Iraqis extrapolate in that case national unity would be lost and, like Afghanistan, a weak central government could see the rise of separatist, regionalist forces.
Significantly, the principal anticipated US allies in the war against Saddam are the Kurdish groupings in the Iraqi north. However, an end to the Saddam Administration would end Kurdish control of illegally smuggled oil through Kurdish territory to Turkey--a significant source of income. Also the Kurdish rôle in smuggling oil into Turkey has to a large extent kept Turkey from attacking the Kurds inside Iraq. For the Kurds, then, the overthrow of Saddam - despite his past atrocities against the Kurds - would presage a worsened security and economic situation.
Iraqi Doctrine: The main forces of the Iraqi Army would probably be used merely to slow Coalition ground force penetration toward Baghdad. Principal fighting would be conducted in Baghdad, and possibly some of the corridor urban areas leading to it. Although US analysts, for the most part, anticipate that Saddam would use chemical weapons, it is most likely that the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units would use mostly mustard gas weapons. It is easily made, stores well, and the Iraqis have considerable experience with it.
Iraqi personnel witnessed and learned from the Israeli ops in Jenin, earlier in 2002, just as US special forces personnel also witnessed the operations while accompanying Israel Defense Force (IDF) units in the IDF attacks. The booby-trapping of Jenin by Palestinian forces - many supported by, or trained by Iraqi special forces - will probably be emulated inside Iraqi urban areas, but on a more devastating scale, since Saddam is clearly willing to sacrifice large numbers of Iraqis to defend his position. Principal urban weapons will be RPG (rocket-propelled grenades) and sniper fire, as well as mortar-delivered and booby-trap mustard-gas weapons. This will substantially slow Coalition progress urban areas, and coalition forces will need to "suit up" in chemical protection attire, and operate under closed-down conditions in armored vehicles for much of the fighting. This will make the conflict far more costly, slow and messy than the 1991 Gulf War.
Although there has been concern over possible Iraqi Army acquisition of as many as 2,800 Renault tanker trucks, GIS analysts were more concerned with finding evidence of Iraqi acquisition of field kitchen units, which would be key to preparation of mustard and other agents for booby traps and mortar payloads. Also, the tanker trucks could form the basis of mobile booby traps.
External preparation: There is ongoing concern within key US and allied military circles as to whether all factors have been considered carefully enough by the US leadership, before embarking on the war against Saddam. Significantly, none of the military sources contacted by GIS doubted the US-led Coalition's ability to succeed in overthrowing the Saddam Government and subduing Iraq, provided the White House could sustain its will.
There was some doubt expressed by even US sources that the Bush Administration could sustain the will to total victory if the fighting became protracted and the casualties became serious, while at the same time media criticism became pronounced.
However, White House sources indicate that the Bush administration felt it had no option other than to push ahead, despite difficulties--any withdrawal partway through the operation would lead to a decisive and protracted escalation from Islamist groups as well as from Muslim states alienated by the war. Israeli forces were themselves preparing for an escalation in regional conflict, and were clearly not depending on US protection in a possible wider war. The Israel Air Force (IAF) was scheduled to begin exercises on a full war footing during the week of November 3, 2002, with all facets of the IAF involved.
Meanwhile, the aircraft carrier USS Constellation departed its home base of San Diego, California, on November 2, 2002, heading a six-ship carrier battle group on a six-month mission. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group is already deployed--there would be a period where both of them were deployed simultaneously in the Gulf. Another US carrier group is in the Mediterranean, giving some 225 combat aircraft available for action against Iraq, apart from US Air Force aircraft in the region, and from US and European bases.
The US Defense Department said during the last week of October 2002 that B-2 strategic bombers would be sent to bases in Britain and to Diego Garcia, putting them closer to Iraq. The US Navy also said on November 1, 2002, that it was looking for commercial shipping to take ammunition and vehicles to the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea amid a repositioning of US forces. The USN has already awarded a stream of contracts to take armor, ammunition and other military equipment to the region ahead of any military intervention in Iraq. US Defense Department officials said that they expected the contracts to be completed in time for delivery of the equipment in late November or early December 2002.
Russia said that the UN Security Council was nearing agreement on the terms for resuming weapons inspections in Iraq, but that "serious" disagreement remained over the US threat of force. Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, met Security Council members on November 1, 2002, and UN inspectors were due to go to Larnaca, Cyprus, on November 2-3, 2002, to start setting up a staging post for their operations in Iraq. Blix had said that an advance party could arrive in Baghdad between seven and 10 days after a resolution was adopted. GIS sources, however, have noted the difficulty inspectors would face in finding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction assets, because of the extensive programs of placing assets on mobile platforms including trucks and barges.
