Finally found my reference to the law suit that has been drawn up as per the discussion here. Have fun reading.
Thanks,
Richard
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, UNITED STATES
Citizens of The United States
Plaintiff
vs.
William Jefferson Clinton, U.S. President
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY-9th)
Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY-4th)
Sarah Brady, Chair, Handgun Control, Inc.
persons or persons unknown
Defendants
)
)
)
)
)
) Submitted to NRA
) for filing.
)
)
)
)
Proposed Class Action In Defense of the Second
Amendment
LAW CITATIONS:
18 USC 241 Conspiracy Against Rights
18 USC 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
42 USC 1981 Equal Rights Under The Law
42 USC 1983 Civil Action For Deprivation of Rights
42 USC 1985 Conspiracy to Interfere With Civil Rights
42 USC 1987 Prosecution of Violation of Certain Laws
42 USC 1988 Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights
42 USC Chapter 21B - Religious Freedom Restoration
42 USC 2000bb-1 Free exercise of Religion Protected
42 USC 2000bb-2 Definitions
42 USC 2000bb-2 Establishment Clause Unaffected
LANDMARK U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION
Crawford-El v. Britton ( DC May 4, 1998, 96 U.S. 827) On government retaliation: "The reason
why such retaliation offends the Constitution is that it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected
right. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. Retaliation is thus akin to an "unconstitutional condition"
demanded for the receipt of a government-provided benefit. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972).
CASE LAW PRECEDENCE - (18 USC 241 ANNOTATED):
2. Constitutionality:
This section pertaining to conspiracy against rights of citizens encompasses due process and equal
protection clauses of U.S.C.A. Constitution's Amendment 14 and is not unconstitutionally vague.
U.S. v. Guest, Ga. 1966, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 383 U.S. 745, 16 L.Ed 239
Congress has the power to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by the
Constitution Ex parte Yarbrough, Ga. 1884, 4 S.Ct. 152, 110 U.S. 651, 28 L.Ed. 274. See also,
Logan v. U.S., Tex. 1892, 12 S.Ct. 617, 144 U.S. 263, 36 L.Ed. 429; Baldwin v. Franks, Cal.
1887, 7 S. Ct. 656, 120 U.S. 678, 30 L.Ed. 766; U.S. v. Waddell, Ark. 1884, 5 S.Ct. 35, 11
U.S. 76, 28 L.Ed. 673; U.S. v. Lackey, D.C. Ky, 1900, 99 F. 952, reversed on other grounds
107 F. 114, 53 L.R.A. 660, certiorari denied 21 S.Ct. 925, 181 U.S. 621, 45 L.Ed. 1032.
A citizen has no rights within the protective power of Congress, except such as are expressly or by
necessary implication granted and secured to him by the Constitution of the United States and the
power to protect all rights not so granted and secured rests exclusively with the states. U.S. v.
Cruikshank, La. 1876, 92 U.S. 542, 2 Otto. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588.
Congress has power by appropriate direct legislation guard against the invasion of and protect a
citizen's fundamental rights, whether those rights be threatened or ignored by unfriendly or
insufficient state legislation, by state judicial construction, or by state executive inaction, U.S. v.
Hall, C.C.Ala. 1871, 3 Chicago Leg.N. 260; 26 Fed.Cas.No. 15,282.
Amendments to criminal statutes prohibiting conspiracies to deprive another person of his civil
rights and proscribing actual deprivation of civil rights of another person, to set punishment in
instances in which "death results," did not have effect of creating new "death resulting" crimes
having similar elements, but were intended to add "death resulting" as factor that would justify
enhanced sentences; victim's death was not element of either offense, but simply aggravating
circumstance, which gave district court authority to impose harsher punishment. Catala Fonfrias v.
U.S., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1991; 951 F.2d 423, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 105; 506 U.S. 834;
121 L.Ed.2d 64.
4. --With Other Laws:
This section and section 242 of this title proscribing conspiracy against the rights of citizens and
deprivation of rights under color of law provide no basis for civil suit under federal Civil Rights
Act, section 1981, et seq. Of Title 42. Agnew v. City of Compton. C.A.Cal. 1957, 239 F.2d
226, certiorari denied 77 S.Ct. 868; 353 U.S. 959; 1 L.Ed.2d 910.
5. Purpose:
Purpose of this section calling for imposition of penalties for conspiracy to hinder a person in
enjoyment of his constitutional rights is to procure criminal remedies or imposition of penalties.
Sinchak v. Parente. D.C.Pa. 1966, 262 F.Supp. 79.
Congress in enacting former section 51 of this title [now this section] intended it for the protection
of the free enjoyment of any right or privilege under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
U.S. v. Ellis, D.C.S.C. 1942; 43 F.Supp. 321.
Statute prohibiting conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate, with "death resulting," is
designed to deter type of conduct that creates unacceptable risk of loss of life. U.S. v. Piche, C.A.
4 (N.C.) 1992; 981 F.2d 706, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2356; 508 U.S. 916; 124 L.Ed.2d
264.
7. Generally
When a conspiracy is directed against a citizen in the exercise of a federal right or privilege with
the intent to prevent the exercise of such right or privilege, there is an interference with national
authority, and the criminal acts done pursuant thereto are within former section 51 of this title [now
this section], and come within the legitimate cognizance of the federal courts. U.S. v. Patrick,
C.C.Tenn. 1893, 54 F. 338.
As between a conspiracy designed to achieve a goal violative of state law and a conspiracy
seeking to effect persons in the exercise of specific federal rights, only the latter conspiracy is
punishable under this section. U.S. v. O'Dell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1972; 462 F.2d 224.
To warrant conviction under this section relating to conspiracy against rights of citizens, the acts
which violated federal rights must have been committed for the primary purpose of conspiracy
rather than for an incidental purpose. U.S. v. Ehrlichman, D.C.D.C. 1974; 376 F.Supp. 29, on
subsequent appeal 546 F.2d 910; 178 U.S.App.D.C. 144, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1155, 429
U.S. 1120; 51 L.Ed.2d 570.
Any conspiracy to deprive a person of any of his constitutional rights is reprobated. Martynn v.
Darcy, E.D.La. 1971; 333 F.Supp. 1236.
9. Persons Liable:
In prosecution under this section providing that "if two or more persons" conspire to perform
certain acts, "they shall be fined" and "they shall be subject to imprisonment" in manner specified, it
was not necessary that all coconspirators be prosecuted. U.S. v. Crum, W.D.Pa. 1975; 404
F.Supp. 1161.
10. Rights or Privileges Protected-Generally:
It must appear that the right, the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or prevent
was one granted or secured by the constitution or law of the United States. U.S. v. Cruikshank,
La. 1876; 92 U.S. 542, 2 Otto. 542; 23 L.Ed. 588.
22. --Travel:
If predominant purpose of conspiracy is to impede or prevent exercise of right of interstate travel
or to oppress person because of his exercise of that right, then whether or not motivated by racial
discrimination conspiracy becomes proper object of this section, pertaining to conspiracy against
rights of citizens. U.S. v. Guest, Ga. 1966; 86 S.Ct. 1170; 383 U.S. 745; 16 L.Ed.2d 239.
25. Intent:
Since gravamen of offense under this section pertaining to conspiracy against rights of citizens is
conspiracy, requirement that offender must act with specific intent to interfere with federal rights in
question is satisfied. U.S. v. Guest, Ga. 1966; 86 S.Ct. 1170; 383 U.S. 745; 16 L.Ed.2d 239.
In civil rights conspiracy indictment, not only must specific intent to interfere with federal right be
alleged but it must be proven by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Wilkins v. U.S.; C.A.Ala.
1967; 376 F.2d 552, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 342; 389 U.S. 964; 19 L.Ed.2d 379.
Conviction under this section requires proof that offender acted with a specific intent to interfere
with federal rights in question; such requirement does not mean that defendant must have acted
with subjective awareness that his action was unlawful; it is enough that he intentionally performed
acts which, under circumstances of case, would have been clearly in violation of federal law,
absent any other defense. U.S. v. Barker, C.A.D.C. 1976; 546 F.2D 910; 178 U.S.App.D.C.
144, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1155; 429 U.S. 1120; 51 L.Ed.2d 570.
Proof that defendant actually knew that it was a constitutional right that he was violating or was
conspiring against is not essential to conviction of violation of this section and section 242 of the
title. U.S. v. O'Dell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1972; 462 F.2d 224.
26 Overt Acts:
Under this section penalizing conspiracy to deprive person of rights secured to him by the federal
Constitution or laws, the crime is completed by the agreement, and no overt act is necessary.
Williams v. U.S., C.A.Fla. 1950; 179 F.2d 644, affirmed 71 S.Ct. 581; 341 U.S. 70; 95 L.Ed.
758.
29 Indictment or information - Generally
An indictment charging a conspiracy to injure a citizen with intent to prevent his exercise of rights
secured by the Constitution must show that it was the intent of the defendants, by their conspiracy,
to hinder or prevent the enjoyment of some right granted or secured by the Constitution, and must
charge positively and not inferentially everything essential. U.S. v. Cruikshank, La. 1876, 92 U.S.
542; 2 Otto. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588.
LAW REVIEWS
Bogus, Carl T., "The Hidden History of the Second Amendment" 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
309; Winter 1998.
Denning, Brannon P., "Can The Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of
United States V. Miller And The Second Amendment"; 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 961-1004
(1996).
Dery, George M., III, "Sanctioning 'Thousands Upon Thousands of Petty Indignities': The
supreme Court's Creation of a Constitutional Free Zone for Police Seizure of Innocent
Passengers in Maryland v. Wilson."
Hardy, David T., "The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical And Legal
Perspective"; 17 Cumb.L.Rev. 585-682 (1986).
Kopel, David B. and Joseph Olson, "Preventing A Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties
Implications of Terrorism Legislation." 21 Okla. City U.L.Rev. 247 (1996).
Lauricella, Peter A., "The Real 'Contract With America': The Original Intent of the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause"; 60 Alb.L.Rev. 1377; 1997.
Polsby, Daniel D., and Don B. Kates, Jr., "Of Holocausts and Gun Control"; 75 Wash.
U.L.Q. 1237, Fall 1997.
U.S. Senate Report, "The Right To Keep And Bear Arms" Report of the Subcommittee on
The Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Congress, 2d
Session (Feb 1982);
STUDY CITED:
Lott, John R. and David B. Mustard, "Crime, Deterrence, And Right-To-Carry Concealed
Handguns"; University of Chicago, August 15, 1996.
LAW REFERENCES:
Lesser, Joseph, "The course of Federalism in America - An Historical Overview in Federalism:
The Shifting Balance"; Janice C. Griffity ed., 1989.
Simkin, Jay and Aaron Zelman, "Gun Control: Gateway to Tyranny"; The Nazi Weapons Law of
18 March 1938. Original German text and translation with an analysis that shows U.S. "Gun
Control Act of 1968" has Nazi roots. 1993 Jay Simkin and Aaron Zelman, Jews for the
Preservation of Firearms Ownership, Publisher
Simkin, Jay, Aaron Zelman, and Alan M. Rice, "Lethal Laws: Gun Control is the Key to
Genocide", 1994 Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman, and Alan M. Rice; Jews for the Preservation of
Firearms Ownership, Inc., Publisher
The Proposed Class Action
Plaintiffs, for themselves, and all other members of the class herein described, would respectfully
show to the court:
I
The named Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States.
II
Defendants are William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, Sen. Dianne Feinstein
(D-CA), Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY-9th), Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY-4th), Sarah
Brady, Chair, Handgun Control, Inc. and persons or persons unknown as co-defendants.
III
This action is brought by plaintiffs as a class action, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, under the provisions of Titles 18 and 42 U.S. Code cited above.
IV
The class so represented by plaintiffs in this actions, and of which plaintiffs are United States
Citizens, may or may not be firearms owners, may or may not be members of the National Rifle
Association, the Gun Owners of America, the Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership,
the Second Amendment Foundation, or other organizations in support of the Second Amendment.
V
The class is so numerous that joinder of individual members herein is impracticable.
VI
There are common questions of law and fact in the action that relate to affect the rights of each
member of the class and the relief sought is common to the entire class, namely:
(1) BILLS OF ATTAINDER has no legal definition. The only statement in the U.S. Code that
reflects most of the original intention of the mandates is from Cummings v. Missouri (1867). It
states, "A bill of attainder, is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial and
includes any legislative act which takes away the life, liberty or property of a particular named or
easily ascertainable person or group of persons because the legislature thinks them guilty of
conduct which deserves punishment." By this then A Bill of Attainder is a law or legal device used
to outlaw people, suspend their civil rights, confiscate their property, or put them to death, or
punish them without a trial.
(2) ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS are unconstitutional. One of the biggest criticisms of the
asset forfeiture laws is the use of "personification" to confiscate property. Personification is the idea
that things or objects possess the free will and capacity of commit crimes. It is an idea deeply
rooted in the practice of witchcraft, the occult, and devil worship. Objects are supposed to get
that kind of power from the devil, or a curse. For a Christian based law to condone this practice
by the courts of declaring "things" capable of the free will to commit crimes is appalling. If a thing
can be charged with a crime then that thing has a right to all the protections of the constitution. Can
a thing speak in its own defense? Is this not at all similar to the Inquisitions? To this regard the U.S.
citizen has lost the protection of the Fifth Amendment rights that forbid the confiscation of property
and the suspension of due process under the law. The 104th Congress made ex-post facto laws in
addition to other laws which plunder life, liberty, and property. The courts and legislatures will not
provide protections against these laws unless the U.S. citizens demand it. The U.S. citizens are in a
state of emergency concerning civil liberties.
(3) FIREARMS LAWS: The National Firearms Act of 1934, the Federal Firearms Act of
1938, the Gun Control Act of 1968, the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990, the Federal Firearms License Reform Act of 1993, the Gun-Free
Schools Act of 1994, the Crime Law of 1994, President Clinton's Executive Order making
permanent the import ban of 58 named semi-automatic firearms of April 6, 1998 are incrementally
infringing upon the Second Amendment at an ever increasing rate. With each gun control legislation
signed into law there are always later calls for tougher, tighter gun control laws. Nothing is ever
enough. There are over 300 asset forfeiture laws. All incase a campaign to infringe, to limit, to
restrict the civil liberties of law abiding U.S. citizens to a never ending shrinkage. This shrinkage of
civil liberties must be reversed. It was the era of prohibition of alcohol that began this long road of
gun control. The U.S. Congress attempted to legislate morality by outlawing alcohol. Congress
learned this was a big mistake. Prohibition of alcohol was repealed. But to contend with the
unwritten law of unintended consequences, in that the murder rate by full-automatic weapons in
gang wars over the bootleg market for alcohol, of which the murder rate by full-automatic
weapons virtually became non-existent after repeal, Congress, whether realizing this fact or not,
passed the National Firearms Act of 1934 then the Federal Firearms Act of 1938. This pair of
laws set the stage for future gun control laws we see today. It has been proven time and again gun
control laws only serve to disarm the law abiding citizen leaving them vulnerable to attack by the
criminal. Gun control is the cause of the rise in violent crime (murder, rape, assault with intent to
kill, etc.).The U.S. citizens are now living in a state of perpetual fear from the criminal, and fear
from the government asset forfeiture laws. The U.S. citizens are afraid to exercise their civil
liberties.
VII
Long History of Discrimination Against Lawful Gun Owners & Gun Ownership
That prior to 1934 their were virtually no federal laws prohibiting ownership, carrying of firearms
for personal protections, or the interstate transporting of firearms for personal protection and for
other lawful purposes. The U.S. Constitution provides protection for the citizen to have the means
to defend himself with a firearm while in interstate travel as well as having arms necessary in the
Constitutional meaning of a militia. The Second Amendment, Article IV, Section 1 "Full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state. And Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.", Ninth Amendment "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.", Tenth Amendment "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.", and the "secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity" clause in the Preamble to the Constitution leaves two inescapable
conclusions that (1) it was intended to give the American people the right to defend themselves
with firearms as they traveled among the various states; and (2) it mandated the federal
government to insure that these rights would not be infringed by discouraging the individual states
from passing laws conflicting with the laws of other states or the Constitution. To this aspect of our
freedoms, the federal government and the states, exception given to Vermont, has failed us
miserably.
That since 1934 laws prohibiting certain classes of firearms and certain components and features
of firearms have been growing at an accelerated rate. That this accelerated rate will eventually lead
to a total gun ban and confiscation in the United States on theory that there are only a finite number
of firearms and firearms features, military or civilian, to which can be made illegal through
legislation.
That in 1982 the 97th Congress, 2nd Session, in their Senate Report on The Right To Keep and
Bear Arms concluded beyond any reasonable doubt, that the Second Amendment of the
Constitution is an individual right [and shall not be infringed]. Yet, Congress and the above named
defendants continue to create and pass gun control laws.
The 97th Congress formally recognized the 2nd Congress' definition of "militia of the United
States" to include almost every free adult male in the United States. These persons were obligated
by law to possess a firearm and a minimum supply of ammunition and military equipment." the
Militia Act of 1792, as passed May 8, 1792, provided federal standards for the organization of
the militia. This was a time when the government depended on and supported the militia. Today
the federal government seeks to arrest and imprison militia groups. With credit to the passage of
time, the growing anti-gun sentiment in society ever influenced by the news and entertainment
industry and anti-gun activists, the Supreme Court's reluctance to hear Second Amendment cases
throughout history, the 2nd Congress' view of the militia is today viewed with disdain, even to the
point of federal prosecution. This growing trend to ignore our nation's birthright of freedom fought
for with arms is shameful. The work of extremists to confuse the historical definition of the militia
and the present Congress' failure to protect or restore, but attack the traditional sense of the militia
adds to the shame.
No other constitutional provision has lived so small a life in the law while looming so large in the
realms of policy, politics, and popular culture. Among the Bill of rights, only the Third Amendment,
which prohibits the quartering of troops in homes, has received less judicial attention. Annotations
of all the cases that have dealt with the Second Amendment take up a mere ten pages in the
United States Code Annotated, compared, for example, to 1452 pages for First Amendment
cases, in totaling pages in bound volumes and 1996 Supplementary Pamphlets. In the history of
the republic, the United States has handed down only three opinions dealing directly with the
Second Amendment [US v. Cruikshank, US v. Miller, Presser v. Illinois] and no federal statute or
administrative regulation has ever been invalidated on Second Amendment grounds.
The Commerce Clause Umbrella For Gun Control
Laws
For the first time in almost sixty years the Court struck down a federal law because it exceeded
congress' authority to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." In US v. Lopez 115
S.Ct. 1624 (1995) the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act (Pub. L. No. 101-647,
104 Stat. 4833 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 922 (1994)), violated the Constitution
because possession of handguns in a school zone did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce
and thus was beyond Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. (Lopez, 115 S.Ct.
1634). This striking is believed to be the biggest jolt for the Tenth Amendment. Congress had
overstepped its Constitutional limits. The Constitution is effective only if it is enforced by the
courts. The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Congress' ability to regulate interstate
commerce over the last sixty years has paved the way for the vast increase in federal activities in
our everyday lives. The interpreted commerce clause has provided Congress with a national police
power. When used in conjunction with the supremacy clause, this police power can preempt any
state regulation that deals with a subject on which Congress has acted. The beginning of the
expansion of the Commerce power came in 1937, one year after Franklin Roosevelt proposed his
infamous "court-packing" plan. Under this plan, which was chastised as a political scheme that
would have the serious consequences of destroying the independence of the Judiciary and
Constitutional law, Roosevelt would have been "able to appoint one new Supreme Court justice,
up to a maximum of six, for every justice who, having reached age seventy and having served for
ten years, failed to retire." (Lesser)
There are many practical reasons why the Tenth Amendment has been used as a limit on delegated
powers, especially the Commerce power. The Commerce power has been expanded so far that
Congress theoretically could declare that children doing their homework has a "substantial effect"
on interstate commerce and thus would have the power to regulate it. In Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1633
(Rehnquist, C.J., majority) the Court disagreed with the dissent written by Justice Breyer who
thought that allowing guns near school affects classroom learning, and in turn, represents a
substantial threat to commerce. The Court reasoned that if Congress can, pursuant to its
Commerce power, regulate activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then Congress
could directly regulate the educational process.
Judicially enforced limits on federal power, however, lack the force and legitimacy of
Constitutional limits. "The main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution...is that the
judges will mistake their own predilections for the law." In U.S. Term limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115
S.Ct. 1842, 1845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and
Scalia, J.) arguing against striking down an amendment to the Arkansas constitution which
imposed term limits on their federal representatives. This judicial activism undermines the basic
thrust of the American scheme of government: rule by elected individuals, rather than unelected
judges. The Constitution itself is why the States are reserved all the powers not delegated to the
federal government.
The Commerce power is the most blatant example of where the Court has departed vastly from a
constitutional provision's original meaning with the result being the loss of State sovereignty. The
Court, however, has also gone beyond the "original intent" of other provisions of the Constitution,
resulting in the usurpation of even more powers reserved to the states. Two of the most notable
areas are the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights and the "substantive" due process decisions under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The "incorporation" doctrine refers to the Court's use of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individual liberties from invasion by the
states. It forces the States to adhere to the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the United States
Constitution. This has been accomplished by interpreting the word "liberty" in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights.
(Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law 60-61; 3d ed. 1993).
Justice Thomas declared in his Lopez concurrence that "although I might be willing to return to the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause,... many believe that it is too late in the day to
undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years." Indeed, interpreting the Commerce
power as the Framers originally intended would restrict Congress' authority to regulate areas in
which the Supreme Court has declared that Congress has the power to regulate, such as civil
rights and labor relations. Such a dramatic turnaround would substantially upset a federal system
that has operated in an expansion mode for more than 60 years. For these situations, it may be
best to say that there are times when we cannot recover the transgressions of the past, when the
best we can do is say to the Court, "Go and sin no more." Perhaps this is the most practical thing
that can be done in the battle to revive the States in the Federalism equation.
The Courts and the Second Amendment
(26 Cumb. L.Rev. 961-1004)
Such cynicism can wear on the body politic. Once the legitimacy of those charged with making
sense of the law is questioned when they are seen exercising only Will, (Clinton, Executive Order
April 6, 1996), and as more people believe that the supposed foundation of our polity is merely a
rhetorical exercise, it is only a matter of time before the institutions established by the document
are ridiculed. One sees this today: doubts about the government legitimacy may be one of the
reasons for the lower court decisions, that their hostility is given further impetus by the casual
manner with which Second Amendment claims are addressed by the courts. Beginning with Miller,
decided in 1939, and continuing on through the Ninth circuit's recent decision in Hickman v.
Block, (81 F.3d 98; 9th Cir. 1996), there has been a collective judicial assumption made about
the Second Amendment that the Framers' could not have really meant that individuals should have
a judicially-enforceable right to keep and bear arms.
Reading lower federal court opinions where a Second Amendment challenge is raised, one can
hear the exasperated sighs emanating from the pages. Mr. Kallgren of the ABA expresses similar
disbelief at the prospect that any right thinking lawyer who paid attention during Constitutional Law
could hold the belief that the Second Amendment means anything. "The regularity in dismissing, out
of hand, challenges to the various pieces of gun control legislation passed by Congress in the last
fifty years.
