No, it does not "always work".
But let's not get carried away with misinterpretation over the meaning of the ruling.
As I read it, the appeals court did
not say that the law affirms the existence of a duty to retreat "on the street". Rather, the court said that, in an outdoor situation, the defendant is not
afforded a presumption of a reasonable belief that an imminent threat of death or serious injury existed, as would be the case had someone entered a home unlawfully under certain circumstances.
The court said that the right of self defense is to be judged on the merits of the case--on whether the defendant had had reason to believe that deadly force had been immediately necessary for self-preservation--and that, for that reason, the judge's failure to inform the jury about the was not in error.
"....to the extent this language [(that of th "stand your ground" law)]can be characterized as extending the no duty to retreat defense to any public place, it is conditioned upon the reasonableness of a person's belief that the use of deadly force was necessary under the circumstances. In other words, the right to stand one's ground in "any public place" is conditioned as an initial matter upon whether the defender was justified in the use of self-defense without regard to the physical setting in which the confrontation occurred. ... The statutory presumption of reasonableness remains limited to the use of defensive (including deadly) force in defending one's home, motor vehicle, or workplace. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a)(2) (2015); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 (2015).
"In the present case, Defendant received a self-defense instruction consistent with the language in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a)(1). The jury was instructed that Defendant would be excused of first degree murder and second degree murder on the ground of self-defense if, first, [Defendant] believed it was necessary to kill the victim in order to save [Defendant] from death or great bodily harm. Second, [if] the circumstances as they appeared to [Defendant] at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind [of] a person of ordinary firmness.
"The statutory reference to "any place [one] has a lawful right to be" does not change our essential analysis regarding Defendant's duty to retreat, since the right to use self-defense is not limited spatially, and the statutory presumption favoring a no duty to retreat instruction remains limited to one's home, motor vehicle, or workplace. Because Defendant was not within his home or premises, motor vehicle, or workplace, any right to "stand his ground" stemmed from the two above-described elements of self-defense, and Defendant received instructions to that effect.
"Defendant was not entitled to a presumption that his use of deadly force was reasonable [789 S.E.2d 687]under the circumstances."
(STATE of North Carolina v. Gyrell Shavonta LEE. Court of Appeals of North Carolina. August 2, 2016. Emphasis added)
On the Defense of a Third Person issue, the appeals court said this:
"Defendant's testimony and other custodial statements established that Epps was no longer shooting at Walker when Defendant shot Epps, and Walker was already fatally wounded.
"...Defendant indicated he shot Epps in his own defense, not to protect Walker from death or great bodily harm, and "to make sure [Epps] couldn't shoot [any]body else." Notwithstanding Defendant's contention that he "drew" his gun while Epps was still shooting Walker, Defendant's claim that he shot Epps in Walker's defense fails as a matter of law because when Defendant actually shot Epps, Defendant was aware that the threat of harm to Walker had concluded.....
"In sum, the evidence failed to demonstrate that Defendant shot Epps "to prevent death or great bodily harm" to Walker, and did not support a reasonable belief by Defendant that it was necessary to shoot Epps to prevent imminent death or harm to others. Accordingly, Defendant was not prejudiced by the omission of a jury instruction on defense of others."
